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government is also keen to avoid.
Other aspects of the proposed reforms, the banning of co-
payments and coinsurance, the establishment of a minimum set
of benefits and an increase in the minimum size of medical
schemes are all counter-productive in the government's war on
the inequality of medical access. The
uniformity which these reforms, when
combined, will produce within an
impotent health care market seems to
run surprisingly counter to the national
goals of freedom of choice and tolerance
of diversified needs.
GOOD IDEA: LIMITING INDIRECT
DISCRIMINATION
A group calling itself the Concerned
Medical Schemes Group, representing
2.6 million medical aid members' lives
has argued vigorously against the
government's proposals. While this group can be said to have
their own interests at heart, tending as they do to have a lower
than average risk profile within their funds, it comes as some
surprise that the response from the health care industry has
been far from uniform. To castigate this group for exercising
their opinion based on self-interest is missing the point. This
group has also done much within the health care industry to
lead the fight against spiralling costs and, largely, has been
relatively successful. To take away all that has been achieved in
five years with a piece of well-meaning, but rather ill conceived
legislation demands further scrutiny.
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The Department of Health is proposing that discrimination on
the basis of health status be substantially limited within the
private insurance market for health. This is to be achieved
through a combination of requirements: community rated
premiums; open enrolment; and that all schemes provide a set
of prescribed minimum benefits. Open enrolment, which is
directed only at open schemes, will prevent schemes from
open access and community
rating will undermine all that
has been achieved in the last 5
years ... (taking) us back to an
era in which the system ignored
the fact that medical aid costs are
higher for aged and sick
members.'
the medical sector in the Medical Schemes Amendment Act
1993, gave u hope with the abolition of guaranteed payments,
minimum payments and, crucially, the removal of a ban on risk
rating. Since then annual rates of inflation have dropped from
norms of 30% to 40% to between 10% and 15% in well managed
schemes. The trend continues
downwards.
The new reforms, particularly open
access and community rating, will
undermine all that has been achieved in
the last 5 years. The government wants
to take us back to an era in which the
system ignored the fact that medical aid
costs are higher for aged and sick
members. As medical scheme
contributions increased, the young and
healthy sought sanctuary outside medical schemes. The
demographic profile of the fund consequently worsened,
premiums increased further and more of the healthy members
left - and so the spiral of decline continued.
Tot only will reintroducing a ban on risk rating regenerate
the inflationary spiral of the past, it will also stifle market
innovation and, ironically, the cross-subsidisation the
government is so anxious to achieve. The sick and elderly will
seek out the most comprehensive benefit structure they can
afford, while the young and healthy will only seek medical
cover when they become ill. The problem is that community
rating and open access are totally incompatible with voluntary
health care coverage.
It may be said that the reforms will move medical cost
inflation between funds without necessarily increasing the
whole. This is also not true. If you are in a scheme where, no
matter what you claim, no matter how ill you are when you
join, you will pay the same rate as everyone else, it is only
human nature to ensure you get good value for money. This
means claiming as much as you can on elective benefits such as
dental and optical benefits. How many people do you know
who, at the end of the medical aid year, realise that they must
use up their entitlement and rush to buy spectacles or go for
that check-up with the dentist? Importantly, with open access
the incentive to control costs is lost - just join a scheme with
low benefits until you need medical treatment and then move to
one with higher benefits. Under this new regime, it seems that
the responsibility will fall to the medical community to self-
regulate and control its fee levels in the face of increasing
demand and utilisation of medical services.
The government intends to penalise those members who
enter later in life, but has given no indication of what sort of
penalties will be levied. Will they be enough to protect
schemes? If they are too small, no one will join until they need
to. If they are too high, no one will be able to afford to join later
in life, creating a strain on the national health scheme the
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'By removing the ability to
discriminate against the old and
the sick, medical schemes will be
forced to compete on the basis of
adding value.'
being able to deny cover to any applicant willing to pay the
community rate of the scheme. The minimum benefit
requirement will limit the extent to which indirect
discrimination against certain groups can be created in
schemes through manipulating benefits.
It is argued by certain commercial interest groups that this
combination of reforms will result in a disincentive for the
young and healthy to join.
The Department acknowledges that within a voluntary
environment, with more aggressive marketing of multiple
benefit options, the healthy may be
persuaded to choose cover, or
comprehensive cover, only when
unhealthy - a problem traditionally
termed adverse selection. However, it is
proposing that adverse selection be dealt
with through specific regulations which
allow schemes to prevent people from
joining only when their risk status changes or when an
immediate medical crisis strikes. The Department has indicated
that people who join medical schemes for the first time later in
life will be treated differently to those who have been members
for most of their lives. And those who join for the first time
with a pre-existing condition will not be covered for that
condition for a specified period. However, those who join early
and remain in cover their entire lives clearly do not represent
an adverse selection problem.
In essence, therefore, the argument from the Department of
Health's perspective is that within an aggressive commercial
market for health insurance, if community rating is not
legislated for, it will lead to under-insurance with many
unhealthy people either unable to find insurance at affordable
prices or directly denied access.
Targeting adverse selection rather than health status will
allow the private market to offer medical scheme cover in a
manner that is fair and open to all willing participants.
Furthermore, people who exclude themselves voluntarily from
medical scheme cover will not be able to impact on the average
cost of health care in any way if they try to join later. They
either never join a scheme, or when they do, they fully
compensate for unpaid contributions. Either way their decision
will have very limited adverse selection implications.
Forms of risk and experience rating are common in other
forms of insurance, such as motor vehicle insurance. However,
equity concerns are a major reason why experience or risk
rating is discouraged in health care. This because illness and
injury are often beyond the patient's control. In addition there
is good reason to cross-subsidise the unhealthy, as all people
face the prospect that their health will deteriorate in the future,
at which time they will become the recipients of the cross-
ubsidy.
Opponents of the Department's proposals frequently
introduce the Australian case as to why community rating does
not work within voluntary health insurance market. Australia
has faced declining private health insurance membership for
some years now, which is attributed to the legislated
community rated environment. The only similarity between the
two countries, however, is the use of the term community
rating. Australia has a National Health Insurance (NHI) system
with a free, high quality, public hospital system. Neither of
these exist in South Africa. All doctor consultations in Australia
are financed through the NHI, leaving a small top-up
insurance market for discretionary
private hospital services, primarily
focused on elective procedures.
Australia largely maintains its
community rating system for consumer
protection, and not for health systems
reasons. In fact if community rating
were removed, it is unlikely that many young people would
join, as catastrophic cover, favoured by the young, is already
provide free by the state in good quality facilities.
An important implication of the Department of Health's
proposals relates to their preventing the effortless route to cost-
containment. As it will not be possible to cut costs by
eliminating the 5 to 10% of members who have the highest
medical expenses, schemes will have to confront the issue of
medical cost-eontainment directly. Those aggressively
competing for members will have to do so on the basis of their
ability to enter into more effective contractual arrangements
with providers, which cap cost increases while maintaining
service quality. Various interest groups representing
commercial medical schemes have recently been claiming to
have 'contained' medical cost increases. ot mentioned,
however, is that this was achieved by excluding cover from
expensive or potentially expensive members. Underlying
medical cost increases have not been addressed. or could
they have been, as the existing medical scheme's movement
remains an unsophisticated purchaser of health care.
Finally, the Department of Health reforms are, by removing
the ability to discriminate against the old and sick, in effect
forcing medical schemes (with their associated intermediaries)
and the provider system to compete on the basis of adding
value. This is an alternative to the current market where
insurers compete to sell less and less cover to those who do not
need it, and a provider system which tries to sell as much
health care as possible that is not needed. At some point in
time these irreconcilable goals would have had to clash if the
private market was to have any sort of future. The Department
of Health is indirectly forcing resolution of this contradiction
sooner rather than later. And one hopes everybody will be the
better for it.
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